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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STArrES LIFE INSURANCE COMP ANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

GHE~AT

TOLEDO METAL ARTS, a Utah
corporation, aka TOLEDO
METAL ARr_rs, INC., et al,
Defendants.

Case
No.11274

*
*
*
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESP·ONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant's Statement fairly states the case, ex('C'pt, that Appellant errs in referring to the Commis~ion as the hold<:>r of judgments. The Commission had
11rJ judgments.
The Commission had only and nothing
11ton• than "vV arran ts" filed.
The "Warrants" were
i11(·ho;: tl'.
1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff and Respondent Great States Life Insur
ance Co. was awarded judgment, in its mortgage forrclosure action, constituting a first, paramount and prior
lien on the real property being foreclosed. The Commission received judgment, "by reason of tax Warrants for delinquency'' constituting a priority junior
to Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's statement of facts are fairly stated except that Appellant errs in referring to the Commission as the holder of a judgment lien; and errs in stating that a "Warrant" has the force and effect of a
judgment; and errs in implying that the word "judgment" is contained in Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 5914-71 (3) (e), being the Section the Commission relics
upon.
The Commission assesses a tax delinquency and if
the assessment is not satisfied then a "Warrant" is
later filed with the County Recorder to establish a priority date for a lien. Utah District Courts haYe consistently recognized the ''Warrant'' filing date as thi:
date for establishing a lien for priority purposes. Iii
many cases where District Courts have awarded absolute priority to the "Warrant," except for federal ta.\
liens, the amounts of the Warrants were small, therefore, the first priority holder paid off the "\Varra11t ..
to the Commission rather than defend a costly appral.
2

rrhe assessment and amount remams ''hidden''
from public knowledge until the "Warrant" is filed
showing the taxable amount due with the taxpayer's
jl(lffi(',

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING PLAINTIFF .JUDGMENT WITH A
FIRST PRIORITY, WITH THE COMMISSION
A JUNIOR PRIORITY, IN THIS REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ACTION
BY PLAINTIFF.
On September 18, 1963, Plaintiff received a Note
Ohlig:1tion from Toledo Metal Arts, Inc., in the principal nmount of $43,000.00 and as security a real estate
~[ortgage. The County Recorder recorded the mortgage
()JI Sl·ptember 19, 1963.
The public recording created a
iirst, paramount, prior and subsisting lien, on the real
proprrty, in favor of Plaintiff. Sec. 57-3-2 U.C.A.
'rhC'reafter the Commission privately assessed the
1axpnyPr and was r,nable to collect the money and then
ll'<'C)]'(IL•d "Warrants" on October 19, 1965 in the amount
r,f ~~2fiG.47 and on January 14, 1966, in the amount of
;<;~G~).+:1, these being the effective public elates for establi-:l1i11g· an obligntion unto the Commission.
Tlte "vVarrants" \\'ere unenforceable until the trial
("1urt pronouncecl judgment.
As the Utah Supreme
•nrt ;;aid in In Re Capitol Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v.
f'1J11it11l ('lea11ers et al, 120 Utah 285, 233 P.2d 377:
\
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''A tax obligation which is given the effect of a
judgment is not a judgment as that term is nSL'<l.
It cannot be sued on in another state. The eff<iet
of a judgment is that it is a final determination of
amount and nature of the obligation imposed alld
that it is a lien against the judgment debtor's real
estate in the county where docketed."
The private ''assessment'' by the Commission is inchoate. A taxpayer in a court defending against the rrcorded "Warrant" may defeat the "Warrant" and the
amount thereof. Therefore, the "Warrant" is "inchoate'' until reduced to a court judgment. ''As for a
lien created by state law, its priority depends on the timl'
it attaches to the property and becomes choate," U. 8. Y.
Pioneer America!J'l Insurance Co., 374 U.S. 84. Liens are
perfected in the sense that there is nothing more to be
done to have a choate lien, U. S. v. New Britain, 34i
u. s. 81.
The Legislature intended Sec. 59-14-71(3)(e) U.C.A
to provide an obligation unto and for the Commission.
effective on the date the "Warrant" is publicly reconkd
in the County Recorder's Office. The "Warrant''
amount is perfected when it becomes a court judgment.
The legislature did not intend in Sec. 59-14-71(3)(t>L
U.C.A. to tell the Courts to allow "Warrants" recordrd
in 1965 and 1966 to be prior and superior to the recon1rd
mortgage of 1963. Appellant argues otherwise which j,
unthinkable, unreasonable and unjust, and unconstitntional as to the interests of Respondent.
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firmly believe that for Sec. 39-14-71(3) (e) U.C.A.
to he coustitutio11al, the amount of the proposed assessment against the taxpayer, by the Commission, should
he idL'ntified in a "\Varrant" and the "Warrant" publicly recorded with the County Recorder with the docket
date being the effective lien date for priority purposes.
Otherwise this Section would be unconstitutional as to
plaintiff;
(No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of Law, Utah Const.
Art 1, Sec. 7; U. S. Constitution 5th and 14th
Amendments.)
~We'

To allow appellant to prevail in this case would do
Yiolence to every financial transaction in Utah. Abstracts
and title searches for loa.n purposes would be untrue and
uninsurable if a later recorded "\Varrant" were allowed
a first priority over a prior recorded mortgage.
The 4th Circuit in 1966 in U. S. v. Clover Spinning
Mifls Co., S. C. Tax Commission, etc., 373 F. 2d 274 said,
"A careful reading of the state statutes does not
indicate an intent to create a "trust" for the
benefit of the state in other property of an employer who fails to perform his withholding obligation.''

In the present case, whatever might have been the
rl·~ult had the Commission been able to point to any fund
artually withheld by the employer-taxpayer for the taxes
llf•re in question, no such fund existed in the taxpayrT 's hcn1ds and in the absence of any res, llO ''trust''
'
11 xistl'd, that was depleted by taxpayer, which could de1,,at the firnt security interest of the plaintiff.

.
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Sec. 59-14-71(3) (e) U.C.A. was not intended to gin
the Tax Commission a comprehensive secret lien relating
back for priority :rnd distribution purposes ahead of the
plaintiff's mortgage.
At the time plaintiff acquired an equitable and vested first security interest in the real property hy his recorded mortgage of September 19, 1963, there was no
money due, O\Ying and payable by the taxpayer to the
Commission and the Tax Commission had not assessed
any amount due by the Taxpayer. The obligations to
the Commission, by the Taxpayer, came into pnhlic
existence by the recording of ""Warrants" on October
19, 1965, and January 14, 1966.
r_}_'he effective dates of the obligations ("-Warrants'')
being in 1965 and 1966 cannot relate back to become effective prior to the l\fortgage recorded in 1963. If this wrre
now declared to be the law of this case it would depri\'C
plaintiff of his property (Equitable Title) \vi th out due
process of law. Chaos '.Yith confusion would ensnare tl1e
financial industry of this State.
POINT II AND POINT III
THE rr_A_X OBLIGATIOK l\IUSr_t' BE PEHFECTED INTO A LIEN" AND ONCE PEHFECTED THE LIEN DATE TAKES ITS
PLACE IN THE FIRST IN Til\fE IS FIR~T
IN RIGHT CATEGORY FOR PRIORITY Pl'HPOSES IN DISTRIBUTION.
"First in time is first in right" \YR s dee la r1c•t1 in S 1 11
Britain, supra. Also the "Fedcrn1 Ta.r Lien ~-J,f '' 1
6

,

1!l(i(j" (PL 87-7] 9) furt here<l this policy and established

some super priorities. Plaintiff is squarely within the
"first in time is first in right" policy. Plaintiff could
and did rely upon the notice of the public records and the
pro1·isions of Sec. 57-3-2 U. C.A., that it had a first priority and secured position with its recorded mortgage in
Hl6J See Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood
Const. Co., 424 P.2d 437 for public notice, recorded vs.
unrecorded interests and "first in time is first in right"
tlieory by the Utah Supreme Court.
The legislature did not intend Sec. 59-14-71(3) (e)
U.C.A. to be self-serving and automatic. Something more
must be done by the Commission to perfect a lien. An
rxample is the Wisconsin Industrial Commission Statute.
There, Sec. 108.22(2) Stats., provides that the amount
due the Commission is to be determined by an administrative proceeding pursuant to Sec. 108, 10 Stats. Once
this ~•mount is determined, Sec. 108.22(2) specifies that:
''The clerk shall enter in the judgment docket the
name of the employer mentioned in the Warrant
and the amount of the contributions, interest,
costs and other fees for which the warrant is issued and the date when such copy is filed. Thereupon the warrant so docketed shall be considered
in all respects as a final judgment creating a perfect lien upon the employer's right, title and interest in all of his real and personal property located
in the county wherein the warrant is docketed.''
In North Gate Corp. & Wisconsin Ind. Com. v. North
i;afe Bowl, 149 N.\-V.2d 651, 67-1 U.S.T.C. Sec. 9384
i 1%7), the Commission's tax u;arrant for an amount was

docketed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Dane

County on June 17, 1965.
''Thus, the Industrial Commission l>ccomrs a
judgment ereditor only because the statute make.~
the commission's lien a judgment lien. The lien
is not obtained by going through a court procedure nor is it obtained by obtaining a judgment in
a state court.''
Appellant's reliance on 31 U.S.C., Sec. 191 is ill
founded. Sec. 191 does not create a lien. It merely establishes a priority in favor of the U. S. when the insolvent debtor's property is distributed, U. S. v. 111enier
Ha rd ware, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 448, \Vi th the Bankruptcy Statute, 11 U.S.C., See. 104, establishing the
state's priority as 4th for distribution purposes and the
United States priority as 5th.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's priority and judgment should he• upheld. Section 59-14-71(3)(e) U.C.A. should be dl'clarril
unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to deprive Rrspondent of its priority. Otherwise, the Section could
allow a secret obligation (assessment) subsequently dt•termined to be due and owing by a taxpayer to the ('ommissic1n to become a recorded public notice (Tran11iill
perfected for lien security purposes ahead of established
liens. All liens s11oulcl be ranked with the recorcliug (Ld 1•
being the effective elate, chronologicall~-, for prinritY
and distribution purposes. The Section should not h·
allowed to destroy public confidence in financially :-;N·nr' ·

8

transactions. The "first in time is first in right"
theory should prevail here on plaintiff's behalf.
rt>C'O rded

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN G. MARSHALL
and
WALKER E. ANDERSON
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